Austerity and Solidarity – Volunteering as Double Movement in Greece

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Abstract

In addressing the theme of ‘The Great Transformation and Contemporary Crises’, recent troubles in Greece provide a stark example. One of the fastest growing economies in the 1960s it has since suffered one of the greatest economic contractions in modern history\(^1\). While recession is ostensibly to blame, more deeply, policy choices in the implementation and maintenance of the Euro have compounded the crisis. Concurrently, a failing social compact in Europe and the penetration of liberalist philosophy ensures that fiscal policy prevails over social welfare. In response, a solidarity movement has developed rapidly in Greece, a country which has typically seen limited voluntary and civic participation. In this paper, I consider these events in terms of Polanyi’s double movement, specifically, by contrasting it with the rise of political clientelism. Just as Polanyi favoured historical analysis, so too, I ask how Greece came to this present state of affairs, reflecting on the role that national debt and patronage played in the development of the modern state. Next, I examine how the Euro, and the liberalist principles which underpinned it, collided with clientelist state practices and further compelled the crisis. Finally, I offer an ethnographic portrait of the work in a solidarity group and consider what this can tell us about the double movement.

Part 1 – Debtor Nation

Prior to 1832, Greece was not a sovereign country, but rather, a domain of the Ottoman empire. It was only in the late eighteenth century that the idea of an independent Greek state first emerged, as the spirit of revolution in Western Europe collided with the classical ideals of the enlightenment. In its eastern expression, the Greek enlightenment was first fostered by the Phanariots, an ethnically Greek merchant class whose trade traversed the Ottoman empire and developing European polities. Initially their studies in classical revival were not reactionary but it was from their ideas and one of their principal associations, The Society of Friends, that the revolution was ultimately born in 1821. As events progressed, Ioannis Kapodistrias was elected first Governor of Greece but he soon fell into conflict with local power brokers as he attempted to formalize the Greek state in the upheaval following revolution. In 1832 the Entente powers intervened and installed a constitutional monarchy headed by prince Otto of Bavaria. Soon declaring himself an absolute monarch, the unpopularity of his rule eventually gave way to the declaration of democracy in 1843. But why dwell on these seemingly distant events? And what do they have to do with contemporary crises? First, in contrast to the particularism we see in Greece today, the Greek state was originally formed according to humanist principles\(^2\). Practically, however, these aspirations overlay traditional forms of governance and power. This clash, between reformists and conservative monarchists proved to be a tension which surfaced recurrently over the next hundred years. Concurrently, the country was forged in a state a war. Sustaining the cost of this and successive wars to follow opened the door to fiscal oversight by foreign powers.

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\(^1\) See Fray and Romei 2015

\(^2\) The Greek state retained this, more inclusive, ideal of citizenship which was only later replaced by ethnic nationalism as it entered the twentieth century (Koilopoulos and Veremis 2009: 4-7).
To fund its revolution, Greece had borrowed extensively in international markets. But repayment of these debts proved impossible in the ensuing chaos and Greece defaulted in 1827. This process was repeated twenty years later in 1847 as the country defaulted on loans for further wars with Turkey, so that between the years 1844-1879 Greece found itself unable to borrow on international markets. No sooner did lending become available again, the reformist Prime Minister of Greece, Charilaos Trikoupis, borrowed heavily to fund a public works programme in keeping with his firm belief that infrastructure was essential for modernization. By 1893, the government was spending approximately 30% of its revenues servicing the national debt (Freris 1986: 28) which in turn led to a further default in 1897. Ultimately, this led to the establishment of the International Commission for Financial Control (ICFC), set-up in the same year, which had direct say in national spending, diverting and state revenues from monopoly industries towards the repayment of the debt, as well as subjecting any changes in taxation to commission approval. This would not be the last time the Greek government became subject to the dictates of its international creditors.

Against this backdrop of government reform and borrowing, a continuing influx of refugees from the Ottoman Empire propelled land-reform as the Turkish estates were dismantled. Larger lands were broken-up and allocated as small-holdings under the guardianship of the state. Industrialisation remained sparse despite the push for modernisation and Greece remained predominantly agrarian. As such, the country was “essentially a feudal society sporting a liberal constitution, which served the local barons more than it did the peasants under their tutelage” (Koilopoulos and Veremis 2009: 40). State influence was weak and taxation mainly imposed indirectly on imports and exports. Taken together, these dynamics gave rise to unusual class relations. Ruling Turks had been expelled or left, leaving Greece with little landed or aristocratic class to speak of. At the other end of the social spectrum, a burgeoning labour movement was being formed by incoming refugees but this was suppressed by the royalist government – without industrialisation a definite working class struggled to emerge. This lack of class interests made it difficult for any group to emerge as protectors of the social order in the economic and political turbulence of the upcoming twentieth century, beginning with the Greek currant crisis.

Already a staple product for export, currant production was further encouraged by the break-up of the land system as they could easily be grown on small holdings. In 1900 a blight on currant plants in France, a key producer at the time, propelled prices upwards. Greek farmers responded by expanding production so that almost a quarter of all agricultural land was now devoted to currants. When prices normalised, however, the Greek market collapsed, devastating the economy. The government intervened, purchasing currants from the open market and put to use in alcohol production. Proceeds from this were recycled as loans to support destitute farmers. Aside from the currant crisis, in the same period the government was obliged to withdraw 2 million drachma banknotes from circulation each year to combat inflation, as directed by the ICFC. Initially, currency stabilization was successful but when Greece went to war with Turkey, provoking the Asia Minor crisis, the currency was thrown off balance once again. Circumstances was further compounded when, after the election of a pro-German monarchist in the 1920s, the Allies refused to back loans extended to fund the previous war effort. In response, the drachma was devalued twice, in 1921 and 1927. In the wake of this financial instability, the government was unable to support the roughly 1.2 million refugees entering the country and sued for loans to assist them. The League of Nations set up a commission to allocate the loan, upon the condition that Greece form its first central bank in 1928. The effect of this was to tie Greece formally to the gold-standard, ironically, on the eve of the Great Depression.
As Greece entered the 1930s, the turbulence produced by economic instability ultimately led to a backlash against liberalist policies. As Freris writes, “the first half of the decade leading up to the war was dominated by the monetary and fiscal effects of the depression on the Greek economy. The memories of these events in 1922-1926 were still fresh in the minds of the public and of the Government. This was evident by the tenacity with which the authorities stuck to their stabilisation programme of the drakma so that they pursued it to the point that it resulted in yet another official default on the external debt” (1986: 97). This default occurred in 1932 and as the Great Depression gained momentum, like many other countries, Greece began to pursue protectionist trade policies. Where just six years earlier the government had introduced subsidies on capital imports, now it reversed course, adding tariffs as economic policy looked increasingly inwards. If these events conform closely to Polanyi’s analysis in the Great Transformation, the election in 1936 of the fascist Metaxas regime confirms it.

In keeping with Polanyi’s thoughts, that both socialist and fascist movements can be read as a response to the impact of liberalist forces, it is notable that the first generalised welfare system was implemented under this fascist regime. Previously, pensions had been available among select professions but it was under Metaxas these were extended to all workers (Freris 1986: 97). Unemployment insurance, a national minimum wage, maternity leave, a forty-hour working week and paid vacations were all introduced, as well as worker housing programs. Protectionist measures tailored industrial output for the internal market and the government upped wheat production through a price support system and various other schemes, as the regime prioritised self-sufficiency over external trade. The fascist response, then, can be read exactly as Polanyi theorized – society moved to protect itself from destabilizing market forces as the economy was socialized. In the years to come, the political fall-out of the Metaxas regime, however, would be dire.

At the advent on World War II, many on the political left where dead or in exile in rounds of persecution undertaken by the fascist government. A communist movement had taken root prior to the regime as Greece has long been influenced by Russian politics. Once the country was occupied by the Germans, itself a response to Greece’s conflict with an expansionist Italy, the authoritarian right-wing government went into exile. Resistance to German occupation came from the now underground left, dominated by communist groups, which set-up a rival, informal system of government. The strength of this resistance can perhaps be explained by the hundreds of thousands who died in 1941 from a famine caused by extractive German economic policy. When the Germans withdrew in 1944, the country was faced with a power vacuum. Nominally, it had been agreed between Russia and Britain, that Greece would be under British influence but politics on the ground led to violent conflicts between various factions competing for control. A three-year civil war ensued in which the communists initially had the upper hand but ultimately the right took control thanks to financial sponsorship by the Western powers (Freris 1986: 121).

After the civil war, this financial support was to continue. Initially British forces had distributed aid but in June 1947 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was formed to organised the allocation of $415 million in aid. The nascent government wanted to handle aid directly but the UN was reluctant and maintained the privilege of allocating funds itself (Freris 1986: 123). Meanwhile, old war-loans and the bailout administered by the ICFC in 1897 had been written-off only one year prior to the UNRRA aid. This debt forgiveness was conditional, however: “in return the Greek government agreed to control wages and prices, to cut the budget deficit and to set up a much tighter administrative system over its credit and monetary policies” (Freris 1986: 124).

Shortly thereafter, a Currency Commission was set up with a three-board membership with
representatives from Greece, the UK and the US, effectively giving the two counties a veto
over monetary policy. Western influence was further consolidated as the Marshall Plan was
brought into effect in 1948. The Economic Co-Operation Administration (ECA) was formed
to distribute the funds and again, as the various financial institutions formed before it, had
direct supervision of the Greek national budget (Freris 1986: 130). Ostensibly, the emphasis
was on reconstruction and development, particularly of industry. In reality, the Truman
Doctrine meant funds also went to military spending due to rising political anxiety in the
Cold War.

To summarise, for almost 100 years Greece had been a debtor nation dependent on external
funds, either as loans or explicit aid. Repeatedly, it had defaulted or been granted debt
forgiveness. The money had been spent as much funding wars and dealing with their
aftermath as it had on internal development. Meanwhile, the price tag of these funds had been
direct interference in national policy, both politically and economically. Where initially,
influence was exerted from Britain, as global power shifted to the US, so did the source of
these funds. But had the Marshall Plan been successful? Ostensibly, yes. Many now might be
surprised to hear of the ‘Greek Economic Miracle’ which saw a growth rate second only to
that of Japan, an average of 7.7% in the period 1950-1973. Undoubtedly, this was a
combination of debt relief, the reconstruction effect and external aid. How, then, did Greece
move from a position of such apparent economic strength to suffer one of the severest
recessions in modern history, in the space of just forty years?

Reform and development

While the country saw rapid re-development in this period, industrial growth was relatively
weak and dominated by foreign investment, which had negligible impact on the rest of the
economy. Rather, growth came from the construction industry (Freris 1984: 157-158) as
Athens expanded rapidly in the 1960s, but this did not lay the foundations for further
development. At the international level, 1971 saw the effective end of the Bretton-Woods
system. This produced various global shocks as adjustments were made to a broader policy
shift in which the US was no longer willing to act as guarantor to other nations. Thus, while
growth in Greece had been subsidized through American aid in the 50s and early 60s, this
was no longer the case by the 1970s and the cycle of investment began to falter. Concurrently,
as America withdrew influence the conservative government it had backed lost support. By
1967 a democratic movement was underway but only served to provoke a conservative
backlash resulting in a military coup which help power until 1974. When the regime
collapsed, finding itself without a patron Greece turned to the most obvious candidate, the
European Union.

In 1981, as part of a broader movement towards democracy, Greece joined the EU. In the
period following, the government once again began to borrow extensively so that the debt-to-
GDP ratio rose from 28.6% in 1980 to 80.7% in 1990. In 1985, a combination of chronically
high inflation, low-growth and public borrowing lead the government to near default once
again. Rather than turn to the International Monetary Fund, the government agreed a loan
with the European Commission. To receive the loan, “the Greek side committed itself to the
implementation of an economic recovery programme, based on boosting the competitiveness
of the Greek economy, harnessing inflation, reducing deficits, and enhancing productive
structures through structural reform” (Skilas and Maris 2016: 37). Rather than implement
these reforms, the government shortly thereafter chose to tackle its fiscal position by
devaluing the drachma. Another programme of reforms was introduced in 1986, in a bid to
modernize the tax system, ownership of public utilities and collective bargaining. Yet the
reforms were dropped only two years later – only changes to the banking sector were
brought about (Christodoulakis 2012: 94). The next round of major reform came in 1991 as part of a broader convergence plan to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) but again these were dropped two years later. In 1994 a more convincing reform agenda was implemented. Many public bodies were floated, for example, Greek Telecom (OTE) which was partially privatized (Christodoulakis 2012: 100). Funds raised in this way contributed to an improvement in the government’s fiscal position which was necessary to meet the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht treaty. The treaty set out targets for applicants to the EMU in five key domains: inflation, budget deficit, debt-to-GDP, exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates on government bonds. In 2001, Greece was admitted to the EMU and in the subsequent years saw reasonable levels of growth and some further, but halting, liberalization.

In part, lack of reform reflects political rotations in which incoming parliaments failed to support previous policy agendas. As Sotiropoulos put it, “a rigid bipolar party system, combined with a political culture of uncompromising views, has rendered consensual reform options improbable” (Sotiropoulos 2012: 25). Meanwhile, reforms were also blocked by specific interest groups, trade unions and hindered by an incapable administration (Sotiropoulos 2012: 25). In fact, the deeply bureaucratic and clientelist political structure of the state was fundamentally opposed to any change to the vested interests it represented. Consequently, the problem is not to explain the systemic failure which resulted from this inertia, but the appetite for reform which existed in spite of it. From the 1990s onwards there was indeed broad support for the EU, both politically and in the general public. By joining the EU, however, Greece’s economy and society would be forced to open itself and vested interests would be challenged. Why, then, was there political consensus on this issue when in so many others it was lacking? As already noted, by the 1970s US political had already waned. Historically always a client state, Greece naturally sought another patron and the EU was an obvious fit. Regardless of the causes, this period was one of halting reforms as the government tentatively opened the economy and pursued ideals of modernization. During the period of relative growth and stability that followed in the early 2000s, Greece mainly felt the positive benefits of this shift towards liberalization. As the decade progressed, however, the drawbacks of being open to the market would become clear.

**Patronage, welfare and the double movement**

In relating this brief political and economic history of Greece, my aim has been to show how cycles of debt and Western patronage were interlinked. The Greek state became accustomed to paternalistic interference by the Western powers. First, Britain, then the US, offered funds to Greece, either as loans or aid, to further their political agendas: war loans to undermine the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century, loans to effect liberal reforms between 1900 and 1920, and aid to suppress communism and create a buffer around Russia in the post-war period. In return for political allegiance, and crucially, adherence to prevailing economic doctrines, the Greek state received financial payments. Political clientelism thus defined Greek foreign policy. It is, therefore, surprising that the Greek state treated its own dependents in precisely the same fashion? As already noted, the 1970s US political had already waned. Historically always a client state, Greece naturally sought another patron and the EU was an obvious fit. Regardless of the causes, this period was one of halting reforms as the government tentatively opened the economy and pursued ideals of modernization. During the period of relative growth and stability that followed in the early 2000s, Greece mainly felt the positive benefits of this shift towards liberalization. As the decade progressed, however, the drawbacks of being open to the market would become clear.

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Industrialisation came late to Greece and the economy shifted rapidly from agriculture to services. Revolution and land-reform also meant there was no effective landed classes or aristocracy to speak of. Class dynamics were therefore such that the political left, also periodically suppressed by internal and external forces, never became a strong voice
advocating welfare. Divisive politics also meant that Greece depended upon a strong ethnic consensus to ensure national integrity. Entitlement by blood did nothing to encourage a universalistic idea of welfare premised upon humanistic ideals. Distributions by the state thus became a battle for special rights and privileges. In this, it reflected earlier political structures of the Ottoman empire, under the millet system where ethnic affiliation shaped interaction with the political hierarchy. Together, these factors explain the politics of particularity, where identity and affiliation mattered most, which was the defining characteristic of the welfare system which emerged in post-war Greece (Petmesidou 2006: 29-39).

Together, paternalism and the politics of particularity combined to create the political clientelism which defined the Greek state. On this basis, I would argue that the modern welfare system which developed in Greece should not be read as an expression of Polanyi’s double movement. Only in its initial formation as a fascist, protectionist response to earlier liberalisation can we see the double movement in Greece’s history. Later, during the occupation and civil war, the country was not subject to the pressures of a market society. Likewise, post-war reconstruction aid worked to protect Greece from market forces and it was only in the 1980s they were felt once again. By this time, however, political clientelism had become ingrained. Crucially, this buffered many within the confines of the state from the demands of the market. So it was that vast disparity developed, between those protected in the public sector and those without protections beyond it. If Greece liberalized in the 1990s the actual depth of reform was weak, focusing on public ownership of companies in favour of changes to labour law. Credit flowing into the country via the Euro only served to entrench further political clientelism, offering the state even greater means to exert influence. So, accession actually worked against the EU’s reform agenda, bolstering rather than undermining vested interests. All this was to change, however, when Greece joined the euro in 2001 and became open to market forces as it had not been for almost a hundred years.

Part 2 – Liberal Crisis

When Greece joined the Euro in 2001, both the deficit and overall public debt were outside the targets stipulated by the Maastricht treaty. The official figures given, however, used accounting tricks to massage statistics so they conformed with the EU criteria. At the same time, once Greece had joined, borrowing costs dropped as the risk associated with Greek government bonds fell to converge with those of Germany. In effect, Germany became a guarantor of Greek debt. With access to cheap credit, the government began to borrow extensively and the Olympic Games, hosted in 2004, further burdened the public purse. The discrepancy between official and unofficial spending became an open secret. Meanwhile, Greek banks also found credit suddenly cheaper, lending and borrowing extensively. While credit flows were strong this system could be maintained but following the global financial crisis, cheap credit dried up. Without expanding credit, borrowers found their debts were not sustainable – Greece had become over-leveraged. In 2009, as the global recession was beginning to be felt in Europe, the newly elected government announced a revision to official statistics – the deficit jumped from 6-8% to 15.7% and the debt from 113% of GDP to 130% (Matsaganis 2013: 152). Already nervous markets became wary of lending to Greece and

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3 What labour movement did emerge was also dominated by fierce political factionalism (Petmesidou 2006: 29).
borrowing costs soared, further compounding the country’s fiscal position. Unable to service its debt in the private sector, the government requested assistance from the EU in 2010.

Bail-out funds were granted, but with conditions. Greece was to undergo a strict regime of austerity measures. National industries were to be privatized, taxes adjusted, healthcare spending and pensions cut, welfare provisions streamlined, amid a broader program of reform designed to shrink the public sector and modernise the economy. The government accepted, and bail-out funds were received. Considerable portions of these went to servicing the debt and also to prop-up the Greek banking system which was, by now, effectively insolvent. Meanwhile, although the banks and government were supported, people found taxes rising and social provisions cut. Recession had already come to Greece with official unemployment reaching 25% and 50% among young people. Falling tax-receipts, increased borrowing costs and contraction in the economy, deflationary forces stemming from the combined forces of austerity policy and recession, had pushed public debt even higher to 180% of GDP.

Resentment was thus rising as a second bail-out was approved in 2012. By 2015, the anti-austerity party, Syriza, was elected to office in a snap election. It had grown in tandem with the solidarity movement which swept the country as recession took hold. The new government began, then, to try to resist the demands made by the so-called Troika, arguing the debt was immoral and the damage being done to Greek economy and society unsupportable. Conflict in negotiations over a third bail-out, due in the summer of 2015, led the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to call a referendum on whether the country should accept the terms of the proposed bailout. Although the question was technical, it was widely understood that should Greece reject the terms it would be forced to leave the Euro. In the vote that followed, 61% voted against the terms of the bail-out. But only three days later, the government made a U-turn, accepting even more stringent bail-out conditions than those voters had rejected.

Euro as liberalization

Competing explanations for Greece’s borrowing and subsequent fiscal crisis are typically consistent with the political leanings of those advocating them. In the liberal camp, corruption, a bloated public sector and inertia in reform are the principal villains. On the left, blame is fixed on the structure of the Euro: that economically weaker countries in the periphery attracted excessive credit due to converging but deceptive interest rates (Galbraith 2016: 3), that more generally, the Euro caused prices to be overvalued in the European south creating a balance of payments deficit which could only be offset by borrowing (Krugman 2012), and that ultimately, without a sovereign currency, countries such as Greece could not redress these imbalances through devaluation. Yet I would like to reiterate that, as the historical analysis above shows, Greece has always been a debtor nation. While this undoubtedly caused friction between nations, nevertheless credit lines were repeatedly extended to Greece – as loans, aid or outright debt forgiveness. True, this money came with strings attached, but seen in historical perspective, austerity reforms under the present bail-outs are not so remarkable. Nor is it the case that the EU cannot afford to foot Greek debt outright. On the contrary, private holders of Greek accepted a 50% debt write down in 2011 while the IMF has increasingly argued the debt burden is unsustainable. Meanwhile, even the more conservative elements of the Troika have favoured the extension of the maturity on bail-out loans, an effective devaluation of the debt. Consequently, the question is, if loans and defaults are historically normal for Greece and the price of the debt is not really at issue – why is Greece considered to be in crisis?

4 The International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
When Greece joined the Euro, it became locked into a market system in a way it had not been before. In the previous century, political developments and the nature of the economy led to the prevalence of clientelism with the corollary that market forces were restricted. The Euro, however, opened the country to unprecedented capital inflows via the direct relation it opened with the economies of other EU states. Overnight, Greece was liberalized even if it was not yet apparent. That incoming funds were consumed according to clientelist principles was not obvious while they propelled growth. When the flow of credit stopped, however, the country went bankrupt because capital inflow had not reorganised Greece’s society according to market principles. This is the nature of the crisis – not the level of debt, but that Greece’s political and economic institutions are incompatible with the market system to which it is bound by the Euro. Conversely, it is also because of the Euro that the central European countries cannot divest themselves of Greek economic dependency. Hence the imperative that Greece reform and the irony that it is these countries, with relatively larger welfare systems, which demand Greece streamline its own.

The crisis in Greece is therefore not only fiscal in nature but, more deeply, a crisis of values. On the Greek side, clientelist principles clash with market imperatives. On the European side, EU institutions must pursue stringent economic policy which contradict its own core ideals, that is, the obligation of states to protect their citizens. In both cases, it is the Euro, and the commitment to maintain it at all costs, from which tensions arise. In this, present circumstances closely resemble those described by Polanyi in ‘The Great Transformation’.

As Block notes in his introduction to this work, “his argument about the rise of fascism in the interwar period pivots on the role of the international gold standard in constraining the political options that were available to actors within countries” (2001: xxix). Indeed, this is exactly the situation in which Greece has found itself – it cannot leave the Euro as this will undermine the currency union. As a result, without the political will for debt-relief, it must make cuts to social and economic protections at precisely the time that they are most needed. Monetary stability in favour of social stability.

The results have certainly been shocking. Between 2007 and 2015 the economy shrunk by approximately 25% and growth has been rare or patchy. Unemployment has lingered around 25% but is as high as 50% among young people, and these are only official estimates. Less obvious are the health costs (Kentikelenis et al 2014) from the pressure to decrease healthcare spending. Amidst this, already weak social spending is being rescinded. Pensions, a key source of income for many, have been subject to various cuts (Matsagnis 2013: 170) and most unemployed people have little or no access to government support. In the absence of state support, people rely on family networks to survive. Interestingly, the absence of strong welfare provisions has meant Greek families typically kept high savings. Yet this money is being depleted to substitute falling incomes and family members not in work. Increasing pressures on family incomes, declining state welfare and severity of recession, form the backdrop to understand the proliferation of informal, solidarity initiatives across the country since the onset of the crisis.

The spread of solidarity groups post-2010 has been likened to a wave, ‘κύμα’, a description fitting for the suddenness with which they swept the country. In nature, the organizations are diverse and include, but as not limited to, initiatives such as soup kitchens, direct producer-

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7 Figures are difficult to estimate but some 379 are listed by Solidarity for All, an organization which acts as a hub between other solidarity groups: https://www.solidarity4all.gr/el
consumer food exchanges, co-operative enterprises, time banks, alternative currencies, neighbourhood and community associations, evening schools, social supermarkets, child and vulnerable persons welfare groups and voluntary health clinics. In a country which historically saw some of the lowest rates of volunteering in the EU (Rozakou 2011), such a shift was dramatic. Moreover, the focus of voluntary groups which did exist prior to the crisis was often to defend or promote a particular intertest (Sotiropoulos 2004: 21-24). Post-crisis voluntary groups, in contrast, differ not only in their abrupt appearance but in co-operation between groups which form a broad movement anchored around ideals of solidarity.

**Solidarity as double movement**

It is my argument that the emergence of solidarity in the wake of the Euro-crisis can be read in terms of Polanyi’s double movement. Just as Polanyi theorized (2001: 151), this response has been sudden and spontaneous, arising from individual efforts to tackle practical problems caused by economic crisis. That food and food initiatives should be prominent in the solidarity movement is no coincidence. Polanyi described hunger as a ‘modern symptom’ (2001: 172), stating that the penalty of hunger during marketization “was necessary to liquidate organic society which refused to let the individual starve” (2001: 173). Nor have efforts been confined to the political left. Golden-dawn, a far-right party was propelled from relative obscurity to take between 18 and 21 parliamentary seats, of 300, in the 2012 and 2015 elections. The party also organises food distributions, but only to those deemed to be ethnically Greek. Both left and right, however, attempt to offer a solution to neoliberalism which has become an object of repudiation in both camps. But if the response on the right has been particularistic, on the left is distinguished by the emergence of universalistic principles of solidarity.

**Solidarity for All**, a hub for solidarity groups, is named characteristically. In their own self-descriptions, such groups emphasise inclusiveness, with expressions such as the following: ‘we undertake solidarity for everyone, without exclusions or discrimination – εφαρμόζουμε την αλληλεγγύη από όλους για όλους, χωρίς διακρίσεις και αποκλεισμούς’8. They speak about values such as ‘justice and equality – δικαιοσύνη και ισότητα’9, and how they act ‘without racial discrimination – χωρίς φοιλετικούς αποκλεισμούς’10. Migrants, economic or otherwise, have typically been subject to various exclusions in Greece. Indeed, where voluntary groups in the 1990s actively discriminated against the Albanian minority (Sotiropoulos 2004: 25), in my own experience working with a solidarity group, nearly half of the beneficiaries with Albanian11. Likewise, assistance for refugees is now commonplace in Greece. Finally, unlike the state involvement which has tended to colour the formal third sector, solidarity groups actively reject party-politics. Thus, while adhering to a broad political agenda which rejects hierarchy in favour of bottom-up, participatory practices, they do not engage in the political factionalism common to institutions across Greece.

Universalistic principles aside, it is hard to dismiss the fact that many groups explicitly aim to resist marketization. The anti-middle man movement, for example, has overt aims to socialize the economy by bringing producers and consumers into direct relation (Rakopoulos 2013, 2014). Time-banks and alternative currencies, by their very nature, seek to create systems of value outside formal, capitalist channels. Groups speak explicitly of ‘resisting consumer patterns, competition, accumulation and speculation – να αντιστέκονται στα καταναλωτικά

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10 [https://istosxaidari.wordpress.com/about/](https://istosxaidari.wordpress.com/about/)
11 I use this term here loosely to refer to those considered to be ethnically Albanian, something which does not necessarily equate with citizenship.
πρότυπα, τον ανταγωνισμό, τη συσσώρευση και την κερδοσκοπία", and make direct reference to reconstituting the 'fragmented social fabric – ο διαλυμένος κοινωνικός ιστός'.

Spontaneity, universalistic principles and active opposition to market practices, provide a clear basis to argue solidarity in Greece can be read as Polanyi’s double movement. In contrast, the development of formal welfare, which did not oppose market forces and where identity and affiliation prevailed, was not. If I have laboured to make this distinction, between particularism and universalism, it is because of the attention Polanyi afforded to class. Warning against reliance on class to explain social change, he argued that it was only when a class exceeded its self-interest that it could effect a change in society (2001: 163). Ergo, any double movement which does not advocate interests beyond its own cannot be successful. As such, the difference between particularism and universalism, which is emphasised in the Greek case, is crucial to our understanding of the double movement. In the final part of this paper, I would like to dwell on the tension between these idealistic poles, not as theoretical objects, but as real social forces in people’s lives.

Part 3 – Solidarity in Reality

If there is a weakness to Polanyi’s theory, it is a tendency to make grand, sweeping statements, reflecting the scale upon which his arguments unfolded. Yet the reality of social change is messy and to speak of social trends is usually to belie the details. If, as I have argued, universalistic values are emerging in Greece’s solidarity movement, these are being forged against a background of political factionalism which has dominates trade unions, the church, the welfare state and civil society. In the section that follows, I provide a brief ethnographic portrait of a community solidarity group, the Byronas Solidarity Network, ‘Δίκτυο Αλληλεγγύης Βύρωνα’, to illustrate how volunteers struggle with clientelist attitudes in pursuit of the ideals of solidarity.

The δίκτυο was formed in August 2012 by a group of volunteers in response to a perceived need in the community following the onset of the Greek debt crisis. Literally meaning net or network, it is, indeed, part of larger network of other δίκτια. The δίκτυο assists those resident within the municipality of Byronas, primarily in the form of food provisions but also by providing clothes and, more rarely, other household items. The food is collected by volunteers outside supermarkets, bought with funds they have raised or received from other solidarity groups and donors. Byronas itself is a suburb in central-east Athens with a population of some 60,000 people. Originally settled by refugees in the Asia Minor crisis it has since transformed into a solidly upper-working class/lower-middle class neighbourhood that resembles many of the other central suburbs in Athens, but still maintaining a strong sense of character and collective identity according to its residents.

Located in the basement of a residential apartment building not far from Pangrati, the space was leased to the volunteers for free by the owner. The δίκτυο is open weekdays in the morning and the morning only. On a typical day as I arrive, a few older gentlemen are settled on the steps of a neighbouring building, chatting amongst themselves. As I pass they greet me, ‘Καλημέρα – Good morning!’ ‘Καλημέρα’, I reply, stepping down the white marble steps to enter the δίκτυο. Going inside, I greet the other volunteers: ‘Καλημέρα’. They call back with replies of ‘Καλως τον – Welcome’, ‘Για σου, τι κάνεις – Hi, how are you?’, ‘Καλημέρα’. These greetings are important and will punctuate the day as people are coming and going.

12 http://www.diktioagiasparaskevis.gr
13 http://solidaritypiraias.blogspot.gr/2013/10/blog-post_7912.html
Officially, the δίκτυο opens at ten and before this time the volunteers are waiting, gossiping and smoking. They chat about personal matters, make jokes and exchange stories, an inherited Anatolian carpet that will not fit anywhere, but also important happenings in the δίκτυο: things did not go well the day before – it was ‘χάος – chaos’ and the issue needs to be raised at the weekly general meeting. They talk of how much money was raised at the last bazaar or how the bi-weekly collection of food at the local supermarkets went. In this way, through gossip and chit-chat, key information is circulated among the members. Although in a basement, the δίκτυο is fronted by large glass windows and doors so it is always bright inside and some of the walls are painted cheerfully in orange. Looking outside, more people are gathering and they too appear to be gossiping but we cannot hear what they say.

Sometime before ten, one of the volunteers will arrive by car, the boot and back seat filled with sacks of thick brown paper stuffed with bread. It is the unsold bread from yesterday, collected from bakeries in the neighbourhood. A movement in the people above indicates the car has arrived as some rush to help bring the sacks down into the δίκτυο - whether to be helpful or because they hope to take some bread before ten, it is not clear. A couple of the volunteers inside are helping them and there is some scuffling as they lay down the sacks, ‘όχι εκεί, εδώ – not there, here’ someone shouts. By now there is a small crowd outside, and they fill the steps leading down to the δίκτυο. One of the volunteers arriving who will work ‘in the back’ preparing food parcels, struggles to push past them. Someone asks, ‘Θα ανοίξουμε την πόρτα; – shall we open the door?’, but another person replies, ‘όχι, άλλο θα μπουν, πρέπει να μάθουν – no, they will all come in, they have to learn’.

Another volunteer and I begin putting the bread on a table, she behind taking the bread from the sacks and me in front trying to sort it broadly into kinds. At ten, a third volunteer opens the door and admits around five or six people at a time, until the crowd has diminished. In each wave, the people come quickly and stand all me around so that I must decide whom to give bread to first. My fellow volunteers tell me to give them one or two loaves depending on how much bread we have. This is the challenge - the amount of bread changes, nor do we know how many people will come or when. Not all the people are happy, ‘είμαστε πέντε άτομα – we are five people’, one of them tells me when I try to give two loaves. Another, ‘είστε κλειστοί αύριο, τι θα κάνουμε – you are closed tomorrow, what will we do?’ ‘Δεν έχει ψωμί – there isn’t (a lot of) bread’, my partner tells them. ‘Έχει ψωμί – there is bread’, they say, and I try to explain that other people will come later in the day and we must try to save bread for all of them. Some accept it, others go away angry. Some even try to take the bread themselves and my partner says to them loudly, ‘μην το πιάνετε εσείς – don’t touch it yourself!’. But if they ask enough, we will often give them more – it is hard to say no. Joking about it with the other volunteers, I tell them it is hard for me to be strict and they tell me that I must be.

On another set of tables, piles of clothes are laid out. Some of the people who took bread wander over and start to look through them. This provokes cries from some of the volunteers, ‘παιδιά, μετά της ένδεκα θα ανοίξουμε τα ρούχα’ – guys, after eleven we will open the clothes’, but the people ignore these remarks. One of the volunteers gets up to shoo them away, asking them, ‘ξέρετε ελληνικά; – do you know Greek?’ - a reprimand that aligns civility with a particular kind of Greekness. As many of them are, in fact, not Greek there is some tension in this statement. The volunteers continue to insist everybody wait until eleven to take clothes and some of the them sit on a couch while others stand and chat. As the time draws near, although it is not eleven yet, the tide turns and the people start looking through the clothes in a flurry of activity. In a little while, the volunteers are commenting on what a mess the clothes are now in, strewn all over the place, it was ‘χαμός – a frenzy’, someone
mutters. In response, a few people begin folding the clothes until everything is back in order. As they leave, they call back that they have tidied the clothes and the volunteers thank them enthusiastically.

While some are taking bread and clothes, other people come intermittently to another set of tables piled with large folders labelled alphabetically. They contain the names and records of those in the neighbourhood ‘signed-up’ to the δίκτυο. On a large poster behind the desk it states in bold letters that the δίκτυο helps around 750 families in Byronas. Unlike the bread and clothes which anyone is free to take, in order to sign-up people must first bring tax statements and unemployment cards issued by the Greek state. Then every few weeks, depending on the size of the household, they can come to collect a shopping bag filled with pasta, rice, flour, canned milk, conserved tomatoes, sometimes also lentils or a bag of sugar, and occasionally accompanied by a bottle of oil or other foods like chicken or fruits, when the δίκτυο can acquire them. Mostly this is a smooth process but sometimes there are problems. One person has an out-of-date statement. Another has forgotten the card which helps the volunteers keep track of his collections. One volunteer berates him, it’s the second time in a row. Another jokes that he is ‘άτακτος – mischievous’. He apologizes, laughing and smiling and tells them that people won’t forget the good they do here, but the volunteer who chastised him looks sceptical.

Other people come to sign-up but if they are not from the neighbourhood they are directed to other δίκτυα, otherwise they are asked to return to go through the sign-up process on a Wednesday evening. A volunteer is explaining this process and is quick to correct an implication about the δίκτυο: ‘δεν δουλεύουμε εδώ, είμαστε εθελοντές – we don’t work here, we are volunteers’. It echoes things that have been said before, ‘είμαστε εθελοντές, όχι δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι – we’re volunteers, not public employees’. Inevitably disputes arise, a man is shouting and banging his hand on the table, ‘δεν είσαστε αλληλέγγυοι – you are not in solidarity’. He is Greek, he says, how can they refuse to help him but can still help foreigners? The volunteer dealing with him tries to keep her patience but it is difficult. However, this is the exception, most of the people coming to collect their food parcels come and go saying little other than casual greetings. One man wants to exchange the flour in his bag for lentils. He is told no, there are rules but in the end still give him the lentils regardless. Sometimes they are interrupted by people from the neighbourhood who have come to leave donations of clothes. A volunteer springs-up to take the bags and put them in the back, ‘ενχαριστούμε πάρα πολύ – we thank you very much!’ he says. A woman who was looking through the clothes on the table follows him to the door leading into the back. Starting to peer in, she is promptly stopped by the returning volunteer – she is only allowed to take clothes from the tables. Afterwards the door is kept closed but later when a mother comes looking for shoes for her child, someone goes into the back trying to find some. Meanwhile, one of the volunteer might stop by to collect a food-parcel because some are also signed-up to the δίκτυο, just as they also sometimes take bread and clothes.

As time draws closer to closing there is little to left to do. A volunteer who has come to clean the δίκτυο is usually mopping the floor. Others who were preparing food parcels and sorting clothes in the back have already left and most of the bread is gone. The volunteers sit and chat and, from time to time, someone who is not on their shift might stop by. Sometimes they share a warmed savoury pastry with a few shots of tsipouro, especially if a former volunteer has come or there is a reason to celebrate. Just after one ‘o’clock, a person comes in to take their food parcel. The volunteers remind her that the δίκτυο has already closed but still serve her anyway.
Value struggles

In this portrait, I have tried to contextualize an abstract understanding of the double movement in terms of its mundane realization. Just as we as researchers must resolve this gap between theory and practice, so must the volunteers, as they strive to create solidarity. Here it may be profitable to ask, to what extent to they achieve it?

As previously noted, nearly half of the δίκτυο’s beneficiaries are Albanian, while it also supports a small number of refugee families living in the neighbourhood. This, despite the objections from a small number other beneficiaries and supporters of the δίκτυο. In principle, then, it is true that the δίκτυο is open to all. Practically, however, the core volunteers who hold key responsibilities are all Greek. Where Greek volunteers allocate food parcels, cleaning shifts are left to Albanian volunteers. Although either may take shifts preparing food parcels, Albanian volunteers were never charged with administrative duties. Similarly, at the weekly general meeting, of some twenty volunteers, only occasionally was a single Albanian volunteer present and made no contributions to the discussion. At these meetings, participants tended to form a loose circle. On a few occasions, when volunteers sat in the midst of the circle, they were subject to light-hearted jokes and reprimands and moved as a result. Despite this apparent openness, the desk at which food parcels were handed clearly formed the heart of these meetings. Here, the most vocal volunteers tended to cluster, especially those with more important administrative roles. While anyone had the right to speak, it was from this centre that decisions generally emanated. Officially, the δίκτυο has no leader but all the meetings were conducted by one of these core members. Jokes were also made regarding this, for example, to quiet the room people would remark ironically, ‘our president is speaking now – ο πρόεδρος μας μιλάει τώρα’. That the volunteer in question happened to be a man where the majority of volunteers were women is also notable. So, in spite of their efforts, the distribution of authority amongst the volunteers still resembles general inequalities in Greek society, even if these were mediated through participatory structures.

As well as pursuing open, anti-hierarchical organization, the δίκτυο has no political affiliation. Politics was rarely discussed, nor will the group accept donations of money. Fear of corruption means what money the δίκτυο does handle is accounted for publicly at meetings. Members also stress a voluntary ethic in their work, to offer their time without any expectation of gain. In practice, however, volunteers do gain for their work: first-look at donated clothes, greater quantity and choice of bread should they wish, as well as pastries and other small extras. For my own efforts, I was regularly given bread and occasionally cheese, olives, chicken and fruit. Such extras are given to any who offer help to the δίκτυο, volunteer or beneficiary, as an expression of gratitude. To complicate matters, some volunteers are also beneficiaries and these extras can be read as a form of mutual aid consistent with expectations of solidarity. Necessarily though, such treatment is impartial. To take an example, as described earlier bread is portioned out and each person should, in theory, receive the same amount. But volunteers regularly make exceptions based on their personal judgement. Sometimes I would be instructed to give out extra bread: ‘give this to the woman. I know her and she has four children – δώσε αυτό στην κύρια. Την ξέρω και έχει τέσσερα παιδιά’. So even if volunteers do strive for fairness, this is not always the outcome.

Another principle of solidarity it to bring together people in relations of mutuality. Yet relationships between volunteers and beneficiaries are often strained and sometimes outright

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14 The δίκτυο raises money at bazaars and other events by selling second-hand bric-a-brac and handmade crafts or food. This money is spent on essential bills to maintain the premises but mainly purchasing food to supplement donations taken at local supermarkets and from other donors.
antagonistic. Beneficiaries would sometimes come hang-around chatting as they waited for closed to be opened. Yet for doing so they were often chastised by volunteers who deemed they spent an excessive amount of time at the δίκτυο. In a few cases, specific beneficiaries were targeted and made to leave. In contrast, the δίκτυο was actively a social space for the volunteers. Gatherings were held before key holidays or around important events. Volunteers would also commonly stop by during the course of the day as much to have a chat as for any official business. Nor was there always trust between volunteers and beneficiaries. People coming to take bread often demanded more. Frequent arguments and constant demands lead to exasperation and eventual indifference in volunteers, ‘you will eat us alive – θα μας φάτε ζωντανός’, one quipped. I was told that no-one needs so many loaves of bread – that people asking for would just keep the extra loaves in the freezer. Another told me, ‘they take advantage of us – μας εκμεταλλεύονται’. Consequently, volunteers came to see that their role as maintaining collective interests against individual demands. In the case of bread, this would sometimes mean keeping bags hidden and insisting there was only a little left. Duly, this would make those people coming to take bread suspicious, and they would insist we show them the sacks which had already been emptied. So, although the goal in providing food support was to create solidarity between individuals, the process of distributing it reinforced a latent mistrust between volunteers and beneficiaries.

Reflections

Historically, Greece was a debtor nation opening it up to Western patronage. Combined with the general course of economic development and divisive internal politics, this patronage propelled political clientelism so that it emerged as the dominant paradigm. Ultimately, this buffered Greece from market forces, until it joined the Euro. The resulting crisis laid conditions for a solidarity response, an example of Polanyi’s double movement. Drawing upon my ethnographic research, I have tried to contextualize this historical legacy in terms of the everyday difficulties of realizing solidarity. In pointing out these ‘failures’, it is not my aim to critique the δίκτυο but to demonstrate the practical problems volunteers face. For them, the responsibility they have undertaken is an active struggle: solidarity, political clientelism and the neoliberalism are co-existent forces which they must negotiate in their everyday lives. Constructing an argument in this way, it is my aim to show how social change, or institutional change as Polanyi might have put it, results from a set of choices within constrained options – that the double movement does not emerge from a vacuum but reacts against a cultural vocabulary in which it must necessarily participate.

Examining Polanyi’s ‘The Great Transformation’ in terms of Greece, I have also tried to add local resolution to this grand, but not always rigorous, theory. By looking at volunteering specifically, I hope the tensions between liberalist and protectionist practices are evident. More broadly, by comparing solidarity with political clientelism I have attempted to shed light on our understanding of the double movement. Clientelism is not an outright market system, its logic being premised neither on markets or economic efficiency. Nor did it emerge as a response to market forces but was political in origin, unlike the solidarity movement which has no political origin but emerged from market forces. Yet the end result was the same: protectionism. Under clientelism this is the protection of some against the many, whereas solidarity aims for the protection of all. Here, then, is a more nuanced view of the double movement, that reacts against liberalist and protectionist forces in society, which may work for or against people’s interests. Considering things this way shows us how the double movement may be helped or hindered by other elements in the social order. Thus, for example, clientelism actually inhibited the development of a comprehensive and impartial welfare system in Greece, acting as “a substitute for social insurance” (Eleftheriadis 2015).
Finally, I would stress how the double movement, as seen ethnographically here, is rooted in practical problems and concerns. How much bread does a person need, should a person without their unemployment card be given food, how many people can the δίκτυο support? Fundamentally, these are ethical questions, about who is entitled to what and why. Economic liberalism, clientelism and solidarity are all answers to such questions and this can be mostly readily observed at times of transition, or, as we might say, crisis.

Conclusion

Following Polanyi, I would like to end with a brief discussion regarding self-interest. As he put it in his own conclusion to *The Great Transformation*, “self-interest was the misplaced premise of liberalism” (2001: 257). However, I would like to point out that both capitalism and clientelism share a profit-motive: both are compelled by gain. How interests should be coordinated therefore went to the heart of Polanyi’s general theory, but it is also central, more specifically, to the double movement. It is for this reason that questions of self-interest and altruism are precisely those at issue in the solidarity movement – because solidarity represents an attempt to manage interests collectively. Hence why I have attended in such detail to the development of particularistic and universalistic forms of collective organization in this paper. Universal principles are vital because the ultimate success of the solidarity movement depends upon the extent to which it can recruit interests beyond its own – upon how far European states and their residents hear its appeal. The outlook, however, is not promising. Just as volunteers and beneficiaries at the δίκτυο struggle to build mutuality, so too, do the European states and Greece. Yet in the end, resolution will only come when all sides learn to trust beyond their immediate interests.

References


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